

consistently show that IOs are the most frequent initiating actor of PPPs. The life cycle of each sector is traced in detail. Chapter 6 compares the cases and draws out the lessons and implications for governance. I highlight a few key findings here. First, the data demonstrate the diversity of partners involved in PPPs. Governments play a key role in funding new initiatives. And there are a variety of types of NGOs involved. Interestingly, NGOs are more active in UNICEF and WHO PPPs than in those taking place under the auspices of UNEP and the World Bank. This may be surprising to environment scholars, who commonly consider environmental issues to be the most permeable to non-state actors. Perhaps most importantly, Andonova's data demonstrate that the private sector initiates PPPs much less frequently than any other type of actor. This should dispel concerns, voiced by many, that PPPs are simply a more legitimated form of corporate power.

Second, autonomy comes from a variety of sources that are not endowed by states. The UN Secretary General has the least formal autonomy, and yet leadership by Kofi Annan, and later Ban Ki-moon, was essential to the legitimation of partnerships throughout the multilateral system. Other IOs have leveraged technical expertise in their issue area to create space for entrepreneurship. Interestingly, UNICEF has always had a "strong advocacy identity" which served as an important source of institutional autonomy (p. 147).

Finally, there are important commonalities across the cases. Andonova finds that PPPs tend to focus on implementation and information sharing, rather than rulemaking or other activities that might be construed as threatening state sovereignty (p. 205). The choice of activities undertaken by PPPs is thus strategic and critical to their successful institutionalization: they push the boundaries of their mandates, but never too far, lest states push back.

Theoretically, Andonova's book elegantly demonstrates the complexity of authority in contemporary global governance. Her work shows clearly why principal-agent theory is insufficient. Authority is not simply constituted by states through acts of delegation; rather, it can be created without the explicit consent of states or other principals. (Indeed, there may be no need for a principal at all.) Put another way, IOs now exist in both hierarchies and networks; this embeddedness allows them to act as brokers to create new alliances and identify new resources. The "agency of agents" is not simple opportunism; rather, it is used to address real-world problems and institutional challenges.

My one wish for this otherwise excellent book is that it had engaged more seriously with other theories beyond the principal-agent framework. The book responds directly to a number of works that conceptualize IOs as agents (Mark Pollack, *The Engines of European Integration:*

Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the EU, 2003; Darren G. Hawkins et al., *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, 2006; Tana Johnson, *Organizational Progeny: Why Governments Are Losing Control over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance*, 2014), which is useful. But there are other theoretical lenses, some of which are identified by Andonova, which also shed light on the questions she asks. In particular, work that considers how authority is constituted in the global arena seems important. Some scholarship in this area looks specifically at how private authority emerges (Benjamin William Cashore et al., *Governing through Markets: Forest Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority*, 2004; Tim Buthe and Walter Mattli, *The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy*, 2011; Graeme Auld, *Constructing Private Governance: The Rise and Evolution of Forest, Coffee, and Fisheries Certification*, 2014; Jessica F. Green, *Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance*, 2014). Other research examines how authority assumes different institutional forms, including IO "progeny," informal institutions, and transnational networks. Like Andonova, this literature seeks to understand how actors work strategically to maneuver around constraints and to leverage existing resources to create or expand their ability to govern.

Realist Ethics: Just War Traditions As Power Politics.

By Valerie Morkevičius. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 268p. \$94.99 cloth, \$34.99 paper.
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— Michael C. Desch, *University of Notre Dame*

Every now and again, you pick up a book to review that you wish you had written yourself. Either it makes arguments you had thought a little about or makes ones you wish you could have come up with yourself had you the time and the inspiration to do so. Valerie Morkevičius' *Realist Ethics* was one of those books for me.

Morkevičius begins by challenging two related and widely held assumptions: The first of these is that an amoral and self-interested realist approach to world politics invariably leads to a world of constant conflict and war. The fact that academic realists were in forefront of opposition to the 2003 Iraq war, and that their opposition to it was grounded in core principles such as necessity and the national interest, seems to have alerted Morkevičius to the possibility that the commonly held dichotomy between realism and the just war tradition (JWT) may have been overdrawn (p. 108) In her account, realism and restraint in world politics are not incompatible.

The second shibboleth she challenges is that the just war tradition offers an alternative approach that can produce a very different international politics, one characterized by cooperation fostered by a rules-based

approach to statecraft and the use of force. In fact, in her telling, realism and JWT are inextricably connected throughout history. Historically, JWT was not based solely upon religious or ethical norms, but it also, at least at certain points in history, reflected extant power realities, the nature of warfare, and the interests of the great powers of the time. In Morkevičius' words, "ideas about the ethics of war are interwoven with pragmatic considerations about how to win wars" (p. 157).

Morkevičius argues that as originally conceived in various faith traditions, JWT was never about avoiding war under all circumstances but was instead a "theory of statecraft" intended to channel and guide the use of force (p. 38). More controversially for many readers, she maintains that it is precisely when realism had more influence on JWT that the latter avoided the common extremes of the Liberal and pacifist approaches—crusading overreaction or pusillanimous paralysis (p. 6). As she recounts, "historically the just war traditions have asked only that states restrain themselves from the worst of crimes. The bar has traditionally been set quite low. This serves a useful function. When the rules are pragmatic—when they reflect the way wars are fought and won—they are more likely to be obeyed" (p. 225).

The early Just War Theory Tradition's approach to war was pragmatic and modest. It was pragmatic in that it advocated limiting the use of force when, and in a way, that was compatible with the great powers' interests. It was modest in its expectation as to what it could achieve in terms of remaking the nature of relations among the powers. Assuming that war and conflict are "endemic" in world politics, it sought to moderate when and how force was used, not use it to fight wars to end all wars or never use it at all (p. 109).

The key change, in Morkevičius' account, came when JWT came to be informed by secular international law. Thinkers such as Hugo Grotius, Emmerich de Vattel, and Samuel Pufendorf viewed international politics more optimistically, believing that the emerging law of nations would tame international politics by supplanting the use of force. This branch in the tradition also privileged questions of how force was used over when it should be used. Finally, the rights of other individuals, particularly non-combatants, came to replace saving the souls of rulers and their soldiers and later upholding the sovereignty of the states as the philosophical heart of JWT (p. 200). The downgrading of state sovereignty in favor of the assumption of a positive responsibility to protect innocents would paradoxically change Just War from a theory of restraint to one of forever war (p. 196).

There is much to admire in *Realist Ethics*: Morkevičius offers a clear argument undergirded with compelling logic. Her treatment of JWT in three major traditions—Christian, Islamic, and Hindu—is detailed and nuanced. Finally, her practical argument about how a recognition of

the realist roots of classic JWT can provide a plausible alternative to the extremes of other-worldly pacifism and Liberal crusading seems sensible.

Let me also offer a few thoughts about her argument by way of extension and limitation. On the former, Morkevičius argues that when political and religious leaders are divided, debates about when to go to war (*ad bellum*) dominate the strategic discourse. Conversely, when war involves other groups of the same faith, the primary concern is how to fight the war (*in bello*), in the interest of treating coreligionists with more care than pagans. She also maintains that it is weaker states, rather than the great powers, who are more attentive to discrimination and restraint in dealing with non-combatants (p. 7). I think that this argument makes sense and the cases studies she has undertaken certainly support it.

I was a bit surprised, though, that she did not further develop a fundamental part of the story she tells. What seems to be central in terms of the extent to which pragmatic considerations inform JWT is whether the religious authority defining it is in power or not. In the Christian tradition, which Morkevičius chronicles at length, the political engagement of the Roman Catholic Church closely tracks with the changes in JWT that she recounts. Roughly speaking, the period from the death of Christ through the later Roman Empire coincides with a more purely pacifistic—indeed other-worldly—view of war. Conversely, the classic period of Catholic Just War thinking spans the period of greatest temporal engagement by the Church beginning with Constantine and Saint Augustine. But with the Reformation and the wars of religion, the character of the Just War Theory seems to shift back again away from the pragmatic approach Morkevičius commends, bifurcating into the extremes of pacifism or what David Hume characterized as Liberalism's "imprudent vehemence."

On the latter, Morkevičius offers a salutary corrective to the prevailing Liberal view that "the realism expressed by these texts is not an amoral, anything goes kind of realism." Instead, she takes the position that it "is a realism that takes morality seriously. In doing so, it suggests something rather radical: that doing the right thing can have material benefits in the here and now. A wise king is a realistic and restrained statesman" (p. 192). And she is no doubt correct that many realists from Saint Augustine onward are animated not only by practical considerations but also find that such an approach is more ethically defensible, at least in its consequences.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that while realism may be permissive of ethics, it is not primarily animated by them. Indeed, given that these ethical outcomes are often an unintended consequence of self-interested behavior, rather than conscious moral choice, many ethicists would be reluctant to fully credit such an ultimately consequentialist approach.

Still, this is a marvelous book. Even if it does not settle once and for all the debate about the ethics of *realpolitik*, it ought to serve as a reminder to modern Just War thinkers of their debt to realism and a much-needed corrective to the facile view that ethical concerns, disconnected from concrete interest, can serve as a bulwark against war's most egregious human consequences.

Asian Designs: Governance in the Contemporary

World Order. Edited by Saadia M. Pekkanen. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016. 400p. \$89.95 cloth, \$29.95 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592718002864

— Mely Caballero-Anthony, *RSIS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore*

As Asia continues to become the engine of global economic growth and major Asian states grow in military strength, how much of the region's material and ideational power translate into shaping regional governance and influencing the global international order? Does Asia punch below its weight with its weak institutions? Is Asia still under-institutionalized?

This volume, edited by Saadia M. Pekkanen and aptly titled *Asian Designs*, revisits many of the questions raised about Asian institutionalization in the early 2000s when the region, particularly East Asia, turned to multilateralism. With the establishment of a web of regional institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, questions abound about the nature of Asia's institutions and how different they are from their European counterparts.

Asian Designs is therefore timely in that it forces scholars and analysts who study Asian institutionalism to once again examine pertinent questions about the nature of institutional governance and compare it with others found across the world. Set against an impressive database of 2,800 diverse global institutions from its ASIABASE-1, established along economic, political and security domains, the volume provides a comprehensive listing of types of institutions across the Asian sub-regions: from Southeast and Northeast Asia to Central and South Asia. From this sweeping view, and supplemented by nine case studies of institutions that cover economic, traditional security, and nontraditional/human security issues, the volume offers a typology of these institutions based on two underlying and observable dimensions. These are its *legal rules* (hard or soft depending on some combination of precision, obligation, and delegation) and its *organizational structure* (formal or informal depending on degree of centralization, control, and flexibility). These two dimensions lead to four ideal types of institutional design: 1) institutions characterized by hard rules with formal structures (HF) or 2) institutions characterized by hard rules but with informal structures (HI); and 3) institutions characterized by soft rules with low

degrees of precision, obligation, and delegation but with formal organization structures like a Secretariat (SF) or 4) institutions characterized by soft rules with little to no precision, obligation, and delegation and with informal organization structures and low levels of control (SI). The case studies show that most Asian institutions exhibit mostly SF and SI characteristics but can also have HI features.

In teasing out these four variations in institutional designs, the authors of various chapters have gone beyond the conventional view of Asian institutionalism and added valuable nuances to our understanding of Asia's institutional makeup and governance patterns. The findings from the case studies present interesting trends that correct the long-held impression that Asia is under-institutionalized and/or that its institutions are weak. For instance, in 2009 the Asian Development Bank published a huge study called *Institutions for Regionalism: Enhancing Asia's Economic Cooperation and Integration* that reflected the view that Asian institutions are weak. But as argued by the editor of *Asian Design*, such views are not only simplistic but also outdated. Asia now boasts a wide array of diverse institutional types, covering a broad range of issues and different patterns of cooperation and governance. Asia is an active builder of institutions that do not neatly fit into one single category.

A key contribution of this volume, therefore, is its comprehensive analyses of multiple pathways of cooperation and governance of regional institutions in Asia. While Asian institutions are characteristically SF and SI in design and tend to be issue specific, the studies show that these types of institutions are not unique to the region and that their characteristics are similar to many of the kinds of institutions found across the world. This analysis makes European institutional designs, which had always been held as a model, more of an exception than the norm.

Another important insight provided is the observation that while SF and SI patterns of governance are the preferred institutional design in Asia, they are not inferior to that of Europe's. Moreover, these designs work better in practice in Asia. More specifically, the nature of design hews more to the kind of power structure in many Asian states and the states' capacity to deal with a slew of governance challenges. That states play a dominant role in deciding the nature of institutional design and that domestic politics matter in shaping regional institutions are indeed sobering reminders for IR scholars, who tend to ignore and pay little attention to political and social realities that affect the nature of institutions across Asia. This explains why "progress" in strengthening the capacity and authority of institutions that deal with issues like human rights and the environment move slowly beyond declaratory statements and plans of actions. The case studies in this volume provide a frank view that state

